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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Fraud against means of payment (payment fraud) remains a threat to the success of the 
internal market for payments. Payment fraud affects the consumer confidence in non-cash 
means  of  payment  and  ultimately  the  real  economy.  In  2004,  the  European  Commission 
presented a second Action Plan. Its purpose was to foster a more coherent approach to fraud 
prevention. This report presents the implementation of this Action Plan for its duration, 2004-
2007. Additionally, it provides an overview of the broader context on the prevention of and 
the fight against payment fraud.  
The Action Plan measures have been implemented in cooperation with the key stakeholders, 
through  the  Fraud  Prevention  Expert  Group  (FPEG).  These  measures  have  focused  on 
payment  cards,  which  is  the  most  common  means  of  payment  for  cross-border  retail 
transactions. The FPEG has prepared reports in response to developments, such as: ATM 
security,  data  management  for  prevention  purposes,  harmonisation  of  security  evaluation 
procedures and identity theft. Awareness actions have also been undertaken, notably in 2006 a 
seminar on prevention of payment fraud with countries aiming to join the EU and a high level 
conference on identity theft and payment fraud. Europol, in cooperation with the payments 
industry  and  in  some  cases  with  the  financial  support  of  the  Commission,  continued  to 
provide  specialised  training  to  national  law  enforcement  authorities.  Other  supporting 
measures included the creation of a database of original and counterfeit identity documents 
and  facilitating  the  possible  implementation  of  a  single  phone number  in  the  EU  for  the 
notification of lost and stolen payment instruments. Finally, transparency about the Action 
Plan work is provided through a website dedicated to the FPEG activities. 
In the 2004-2007 period, new European legislation in the financial services area has been 
enacted.  This  legislation  contains  provisions  which  directly  or  indirectly  address  the 
prevention of payment fraud.  In the first place, the directive on the prevention of money 
laundering (2005) requires the implementation of a sound "know your customer" policy by 
financial institutions. Additionally, the new Directive on payment services (2007) contains 
specific  rules  aimed  at  reducing  the  risks  and  consequences  of  unauthorised  payment 
transactions.  This  new  legislation  contributes  to  the  creation  of  a  more  robust  legal 
environment at EU level in this area.  
Guaranteeing high standards of security is one of the aims of the work leading to the creation 
of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). The European payments industry is working on 
the harmonization of security  requirements, in  particular  regarding cards. The new SEPA 
Cards Framework attaches high importance to fraud prevention and requires any adhering 
card scheme to support fraud prevention activities in accordance with the European Payments 
Council (EPC) resolutions on card fraud. The European Central Bank policy regarding the 
oversight  framework  for  card  schemes  will  also  contribute  to  reinforcing  safety  of  the 
payment cards, also in relation to securing the initiation and operation of transactions.  
In  addition to the legislative developments, several initiatives regarding the prevention of 
payment  fraud  have  been  undertaken,  in  most  cases  directly  by  the  payment  industry. 
Regarding face to face situations (in payment cards), the movement towards the EMV chip 
and  PIN  technology  as  transaction  authentication  method  in  payment  cards  has  largely 
contributed to the reduction in fraud associated with lost and stolen cards in Europe. Also in 
relation to lost and stolen payment instruments, the Commission adopted in 2007 a decision 
reserving the whole range of phone numbers beginning with "116" to be used for "harmonised  
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services of social value". This type of number could be used for card stop services if the 
criteria for the allocation of the numbers are fulfilled.  
However, skimming fraud has increased in recent years. In this situation, the magnetic stripe 
(not the chip) of cards is copied in payment terminals or, more often, in ATMs or unattended 
payment terminals (for example those in petrol stations). The copied data (in some cases the 
PIN code is also captured) are used for the production of counterfeit cards which are then 
either used in non-EMV terminals (in Europe or in countries where the EMV technology has 
not been implemented) or for non-face to face payments (e.g. mostly Internet transactions). 
The  payment  industry,  through  the  EPC  and  the  EAST  Group  are  adopting  preventive 
measures  to  counter  this  phenomenon.  An  FPEG  report  provides  an  overview  of  these 
measures.  
The EMV success has resulted in an overall decrease in card fraud losses, but at the same time 
generated  a  de  facto  shift  of  payment  card  fraud  towards  remote  (e.g.  non-face  to  face) 
situations, mostly in the Internet environment: the so-called card-not-present fraud. This 
type of fraud is increasing in Europe and is considered to constitute the highest threat for 
payment cards. In reaction to this threat, the EPC recommends ensuring the use of the card 
security  codes as from January 2008 and the payment industry is providing incentives to 
merchants and cardholders for the use of enhanced secure verification methods in internet 
payments (mostly  based on the 3D Secure market standard). Regarding e-banking fraud 
(which includes phishing), banks are progressively moving to enhanced customer/transaction 
authentication methods. An insight on user authentication methods in cashless payments is 
provided  in  a  study  conducted  for  the  Commission  in  2007.  Fraud  in  non-face  to  face 
situations is related to identity theft/fraud and cybercrime (see below). 
The preventive activity of payment service providers also relies on fraud detection tools or 
monitoring databases, as recognised in the payment services directive. However, the desire by 
the payment industry to pool data between payment instrument issuers (for instance at card 
scheme level in a SEPA wide area) poses challenges as far as data protection is concerned. 
The FPEG discussed the data sharing issue in different meetings and a report on the limits to 
the sharing of personal data for fraud prevention purposes was prepared in December 2006.  
Prosecuting fraud should complement the preventive measures. EU legislation is this area 
was adopted in 2001 and is implemented in most EU Member States. While the deterrent 
effect of criminal penalties for payment fraud offences should be a key element of the fight 
against fraud, some stakeholders have the perception that the penalties applied in practice at 
national level in this field are generally too low to be dissuasive. There are additional practical 
difficulties  for  the  law  enforcement  authorities  to  ensure  a  fast  reaction  against  fraud. 
Particular  problems  include  finding  enough  evidence  to  prove  the  criminal  conduct  (also 
because of the high technology dimension of most fraudulent conduct) and the cross-border 
dimension of many attacks. Member States have reacted by creating/reinforcing specialised 
police  units  to  deal  with  cybercrime.  Additionally,  cross-border  police  and  judicial 
cooperation  and  assistance  have  been  reinforced,  notably  through  the  Joint  Investigations 
Team network sponsored by Europol and Eurojust, with encouraging results. In the last years 
Europol provided specialised training, in cooperation with payment card schemes, to national 
law enforcement authorities on operational aspects of payment card fraud, in particular on 
skimming  and  hi-tech  payment  card  crime  over  the  Internet.  This  specialised  training 
improves  the  expertise  and  the  financial  investigation  capacity  of  the  law  enforcement 
authorities in this field.   
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Some challenges remain. First, increasing the understanding of the nature and the extent 
of  the  problem  is  of  primary  importance  in  order  to  evaluate  the  risks,  implement  the 
appropriate measures to counter fraud and measure their effectiveness. The EPC is developing 
an anti-fraud database that should be operational in 2008 and would integrate aggregated 
statistics on fraud covering both national and SEPA-wide transactions. The Commission has 
also addressed the need to improve the statistics in the criminal area as regards crimes and 
criminal prosecution by launching an ambitious action plan 2006-2010 on developing an EU 
strategy to measure crime and criminal justice.
.  
Secondly,  payment  fraud  is  a  moving  target.  New  threats  appear,  in  particular  identity 
theft/fraud  and,  more  generally,  cyber  crime  (which  includes  many  of  the  identity 
theft/fraud typologies). Community responses to these new threats have been numerous in 
recent years, both at regulatory level and by raising greater awareness. Regarding identity 
theft, this has included, inter alia, the high level conference on identity theft/fraud organised 
by the Commission in 2006, which has resulted in some follow up actions, or FPEG report. 
The  identity  theft/fraud  problem  also  raises  issues  from  the  wider  perspective  of  identity 
management. The Commission has funded important research projects in this area through the 
6
th Framework Research Programme (FP6) and has launched a new set of information and 
communication technologies security projects as part of 7
th Framework Research Programme 
(FP7, 2007-2013). Regarding cybercrime, the Commission adopted a communication in 2007 
setting out its priorities in this area. In addition, the EU institutions continue to develop policy 
with  a  view  to  improving  network  and  information  security,  which  continues  to  pose 
challenging problems. In 2005 the Council adopted a framework decision requesting Member 
States to criminalise certain attacks against information systems. In 2006 the Commission also 
presented a specific communication on network and information security identifying risks and 
possible work streams for the future. The establishment of ENISA (European Network and 
Information Security Agency) in 2004 has also been a major step forward in the EU's efforts 
to respond to the challenges  relating to network and information security. The regulatory 
framework  for  electronic  communications,  which  includes  security-related  provisions,  is 
currently  under  review  and  in  2007  the  Commission  proposed  modifications  to  three 
directives, including on security issues. In a communication of 2007, the Commission is also 
promoting data protection by privacy enhancing technologies. 
Finally, fraud, even if it affects a minority of users, undermines the general confidence in 
payments systems. A study conducted for the Commission in 2007 shows that user trust in 
certain  authentication  methods  for  cashless  payments  could  be  improved.  Maintaining  or 
enhancing  user  confidence  does  not  necessarily  require  new  legislation  but  rather  the 
commitment of the parties involved to achieve this goal. Increasing public awareness and 
education to enhance trust, and also to avoid the pitfalls of payment fraud, is important in this 
context. In the light of the increasing cyber crime attacks and the development of cashless 
payments on line, this also requires trusting the information society in general.  
The work conducted in 2004-2007 shows that while it is important to ensure the security of 
means of payment and payment systems, it is also important to improve consumer confidence 
and  trust.  The  new  legal  framework  for  payments,  including  the  "know  your  customer" 
obligations, as well as the development of SEPA by industry, should provide a good basis for 
increasing both security and trust. Additionally, the measures adopted by the Commission, 
beyond the Action Plan, in relation to the prevention of and fight against identity theft/fraud 
and cyber crime, should also contribute to those goals.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fraud  against  means  of  payment  (payment  fraud) remains  a  threat  for  the  success  of  the 
internal market for payments. For instance, if one looks only at payment cards, there are 10 
million  fraudulent  transactions  in  the  SEPA  area  per  year,  affecting  500 000  merchants, 
representing roughly €1 Billion losses
1. This threat may affect the consumer confidence in 
non-cash  means  of  payment  and  ultimately  the  real  economy
2.  In  this  context,  rapid 
technological developments and criminals' adaptation to a fast changing environment make 
the prevention of and the fight against payment fraud particularly challenging. 
In 2004 the European Commission presented an Action Plan
3 with a view to fostering a more 
coherent approach to fraud prevention in the 2004-2007 period (hereinafter, the 2004-2007 
Action Plan). The 2004-2007 Action Plan consisted of non-legislative measures and built on a 
previous plan of 2001
4. This report will first describe the main initiatives undertaken in the 
context of the 2004-2007 Action Plan (section 2).  
In addition, this report will provide an overview of the broader context on the prevention of 
and the fight against payment fraud. Thus, this report will present the legislative evolution in 
the financial area affecting the prevention of payment fraud as well as the launching of the 
banking industry initiative to progressively establish a Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), 
starting in January 2008 (see section 3). It will also describe the state of the play regarding 
preventive measures (section 4); the developments at EU level regarding the prosecution of 
payment fraud (section 5); and the main work undertaken by the Commission in relation to 
the new challenges, such as identity theft and cyber crime (section 6). Some conclusions will 
be presented in section 7. 
2.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2004-2007 ACTION PLAN  
The key principle of the 2004-2007 Action Plan work was cooperation among stakeholders: 
e.g. the prevention of fraud is more effective if implemented in partnership. This principle has 
guided the implementation of the Action Plan, for which the Commission has been assisted by 
the Fraud Prevention Experts Group – FPEG. This experts’ group at EU level, established 
under the 2001 Action Plan, includes representatives of parties involved in fraud prevention: 
i.e.  payment  schemes,  banks,  law  enforcement  authorities,  financial  supervisors,  retailers, 
consumer  groups,  etc.  The  FPEG  provides  a  platform  where  stakeholders  can  effectively 
exchange information and best practice to prevent fraud. It thus contributes to intensifying 
cooperation between interested parties, especially at cross-border level.  
                                                 
1  Presentation of the EPC Card Fraud Prevention Task Force at the FPEG meeting of 28 November 2006. 
2  See speech by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, ECB, of 21.9.2004: "[…] if fraud becomes too high for the 
banking sector, banks may in the future also seek compensation from users. In addition, large-scale or 
spectacular fraud events in card schemes may trigger a sudden change in the payment means chosen by 
the public. Other means of payments may not be able to cope with sudden demand peaks or, at least, 
there  could  be  important  frictional  costs  and  impact  on  the  real  economy,  in  particular  on  retail 
commerce. Fraud combat is a top priority. […]" 
3  Communication from the Commission of 20.10.2004, A new EU Action Plan 2004-2007 to prevent 
fraud on non-cash means of payment, COM(2004)679 final. 
4  Communication from the Commission of 9.2.2001, Preventing fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash 
means of payments, COM(2001)11 final.  
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Regarding technological and fraud developments, the work focused on payment cards, which 
is the most common means of payment for cross-border retail transactions as well as on the 
Internet.  The  FPEG  prepared  reports  on  two  key  issues:  (i)  harmonisation  of  security 
evaluation criteria for card payments (see section 3 below) and (ii) ATM security, including 
card skimming (see section 4.1 below). The Commission also published in 2007 a study on 
user verification methods in cashless payments (see section 6.3 below). The FPEG further 
undertook work with a view to facilitating the exchange of information among stakeholders 
for  an  early  detection  of  fraud  (cf.  point  6  of  the  Action  Plan).  A  report  was  prepared 
evaluating the implications of the personal data protection legal framework for the processing 
of fraud related data (see section 4.3 below).  
The Commission also worked with a view to contributing to the increase in the performance 
of national authorities in this area. This included in particular the organisation of a seminar on 
prevention of payment fraud with countries aiming to join the EU, which took place on 8-9 
March  2006
5.  It  was  attended  by  representatives  from  the  public  and  private  sectors  of 
Bulgaria  and  Romania  (at  the  time  accession  countries);  Croatia,  Turkey  and  the  former 
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (candidate  countries);  Serbia,  Montenegro  and  Bosnia 
Herzegovina (potential candidate countries). The aim of the seminar was to enable police 
officers,  prosecutors  and  regulators  from  these  countries  to  increase  their  knowledge  and 
awareness  of  the  issues  related  to  payment  fraud.  It  was  a  first  step  towards  enhancing 
cooperation on payment fraud between EU Member States and these countries. Additionally, 
Europol,  in  cooperation with  the  payments  industry  and  in  some  cases  with  the  financial 
support  of  the  Commission,  continued  to  provide  specialised  training  to  national  law 
enforcement authorities (see section 5 below). Finally, The Commission also organised a high 
level Conference in November 2006 for the benefit of national policy makers with regard to 
identity theft and payment fraud, one of the new challenges in the field of fraud prevention 
(see section 6.2 below).  
Other fraud prevention measures were also completed, for instance, the creation of a database 
of  original  and  counterfeit  identity  documents  (see  section  6.2  below)  or  the  possible 
implementation of a single phone number in the EU for the notification of lost and stolen 
cards (see section 4.1 below) 
In addition to the awareness raising initiatives, such as the seminar and conference in 2006, 
the  Commission  and  the  FPEG  have  provided  greater  transparency  about  the  work 
undertaken. A website dedicated to the FPEG activities was created
6, providing access to: the 
FPEG reports; information on discussions held; presentations made and other related issues.  
In this context, although not directly addressed in the Action Plan, the Commission has been 
providing financial support to some initiatives undertaken by stakeholders in relation to the 
prevention of and/or the fight against payment fraud. See Annex 1 for further detail.  
Further detail on the main Action Plan initiatives
7 is provided in the following sections of this 
paper.  
                                                 
5  See Commission press release of 9.3.2006 (IP/06/290) 
6  www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/index_en.htm  
7  See Annex 2 for a list of the 2004-2007 Action Plan points and its concrete implementation.   
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3.  IMPROVED SECURITY OF CASHLESS PAYMENTS FURTHER TO RECENT LEGISLATIVE 
DEVELOPMENTS AND THE LAUNCHING OF SEPA  
3.1.  The new legal framework at EU level for secure cashless payments 
In the 2004-2007 period, new European legislation in the financial services area has been 
enacted containing provisions which directly or indirectly address the prevention of payment 
fraud.  This  new  legislation  has  thus  contributed  to  the  creation  of  a  more  robust  legal 
environment at EU level
8.  
Firstly, the new directive
9 on the prevention of money laundering of 2005 has introduced 
more detailed obligations for financial institutions in relation to customer due diligence which 
at  the  same  time  are  more  flexible  and  better  adapted  to  the  level  of  risk  involved.  The 
implementation of a sound "know your customer" policy by financial institutions should lead 
to a better management of the fraud risks involved, notably regarding identity theft type of 
fraud  (e.g.  when  accepting  new  customers)  or  non-face  to  face  situations  (e.g.  when 
monitoring customers' transactions)
10. The particular question of non-face to face transactions 
was examined by the Commission in 2006
11, with the identification of best practices and of 
possible ways forward.  
Secondly, a new directive
12 on payment services in the internal market (PSD) was adopted in 
2007.  This  directive  aims  at  ensuring  that  payments  within  the  EU  –  in  particular  credit 
transfer, direct debit and card payments – become as easy, efficient, and secure as domestic 
payments within a Member State are today. By setting up a harmonised legal framework for 
payments within the EU, the PSD will provide more transparency and will reinforce the rights 
and protection of all the users of payment services (consumers, retailers, large  and small 
companies  as  well  as  public  authorities).  Several  provisions  of  this  directive  directly  or 
indirectly address payment fraud issues, in particular: (i) information requirements on the 
payment instruments, including on the use of the payment instrument and its personalised 
features (cf. Articles 42(2) and 42(5)); (ii) the authorisation of payment transactions, in order 
to reduce the risks and consequences of unauthorised payment transactions, including also 
allocation of liability between the payer and his payment service provider (cf. Articles 54 and 
seq.); and (iii) the processing of data for fraud prevention purposes (cf. Article 79).  
                                                 
8  Legislation in other areas also directly or indirectly addresses the issues of payment fraud prevention or 
prosecution. See in particular section 5 for criminal legislation and sections 4 and 6 for legislation on 
personal data protection or information and communication technologies.  
9  Directive  2005/60/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  October  2005  on  the 
prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purpose  of  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15. 
10  See FPEG report on Identity Theft/Fraud (2007).  
11  See Commission Staff Working Document, of 19.12.2006, on the application of Directive 91/308/EEC 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering in relation to 
the identification of clients in non-face to face transactions and possible implications for electronic 
commerce; SEC(2006)1792. 
12  Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment 
services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC 
and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, OJ L 319 of 5.12.2007.   
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3.2.  The security of payment instruments and the SEPA environment 
The SEPA should enable people to make payments throughout the euro area as quickly, safely 
and easily as they make national payments. This calls for the removal of all technical, legal 
and  commercial  barriers  between  the  current  national  payment  markets.  The  European 
Payments Council (EPC), grouping the payment industry, has been working (and continues to 
work)  to  ensure  the  standardization  of  payment  services  and  processing  regarding  direct 
debits, credit transfers and card payments. Guaranteeing high standards of security is one of 
the aims of this work.  
In the case of payment cards, one of the action points identified in the 2004-2007 Action Plan 
related  to  the  question  of  mutual  recognition  of  the  certification  of  terminals,  cards  and 
network  interfaces.  The  FPEG  prepared  a  report
13  on  security  evaluation.  This  report 
explained  that  the  situation  was  characterized  by  a  diversity  of  evaluation  methods,  a 
multiplicity of actors (i.e. essentially the ECB and the national central banks, the banking 
industry, the payment schemes, the certification bodies, the issuers, the evaluation laboratories 
and the manufacturers) and the absence of a harmonized legal framework at European level. 
The FPEG recommended intensifying efforts towards aligning security evaluation procedures, 
choosing a formal/neutral method of providing a sound evaluation assurance and promoting 
the exchange of information on attacks on payment systems to improve vulnerability analysis 
and penetration testing. The FPEG was of the view that the alignment of security evaluation 
procedures should result in significant cost reduction while guaranteeing a consistent high 
security level in the payment area.  
In  this  context,  the  EPC  is  developing  standard  specifications  for  cards,  terminals  and 
networks,  which  would  include  mandatory  minimum  requirements  as  well  as  optional 
recommended  specifications  and/or  best  practice  guidelines.  This  work  is  focusing  on  4 
domains
14 leading to 5 main initiatives/standards. Among these five initiatives, the Common 
Approval Scheme (CAS) project, an initiative of several European payment schemes, aims at 
proposals  for:  (a)  minimum  security  requirements  for  cards  and  terminals  (‘point  of 
interaction’);  (b)  a  Common  and  Neutral  security  evaluation  methodology;  and  (c)  a 
framework for mutual recognition and type approval across SEPA
15. This process, however, 
raises  the  issue  of  deciding  what  the  EU  body/authority  will  be  for  (i)  the 
accreditation/monitoring of the laboratories in charge of evaluations; (ii) the endorsement of 
‘CAS’ proposals and setting up the security rules for SEPA (CAS is proposing a certain level 
of security, which is high for cards and is yet to be finalized for points of interaction); (iii) the 
definition of an adequate minimum security level for all payment Schemes across SEPA; and 
(iv) the enforcement of this minimum security level for mutual recognition across the EU. 
Additionally,  the  new  SEPA  Cards  Framework
16  attaches  particular  importance  to  fraud 
prevention and requires any adhering card scheme to support fraud prevention activities in 
accordance with the EPC resolutions on card fraud. Two resolutions have been adopted so far 
by the EPC plenary, one in December 2003 ("Preventing and fighting fraud across Europe") 
and another one in March 2007 ("Preventing Card Fraud in the new SEPA environment"). 
The latest recommendation focuses on the prevention of the use of counterfeit cards at SEPA 
                                                 
13  FPEG, A survey on the security evaluation procedures for the certification of payment products in the 
European Union, June 2007. 
14  Card-to-terminal, Terminal-to-acquirer, Acquirer-to-issuer and Certification and Approval. 
15  See presentation by the EPC at the FPEG meeting of June 2007, available at the FPEG website. 
16  European Payments Council, 8 March 2006, SEPA Cards Framework, version 2.0, in particular p.14.  
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terminals  (see  section  4.1),  combating  card-not-present  fraud  (see  section  4.2)  and  the 
collection of statistics on card fraud (see section 6.1).  
3.3.  The ECB oversight framework for card schemes 
The importance of fraud prevention for the efficiency of payment systems and instruments has 
always  been  underlined  by  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB).  This  has  again  been 
highlighted in the recent announcement by the ECB when presenting its oversight framework 
for  card  schemes,  which  lays  down  Eurosystem  oversight  standards  with  regard  to  card 
payment schemes operating in the euro area
17. The ECB emphasizes that, owing to the nature 
of card schemes systems, the risk of loss of  reputation is greater than  for other types of 
payment systems. Breach of reputation can have a severe impact on users' confidence in cards 
(see section 6.3). 
These oversight standards focus on ensuring the safety and efficiency of the card payment 
schemes. Operational risk in this context includes the risk of fraud, since this can be defined 
as a wrongful or criminal deception which may lead to a financial loss for one of the parties 
involved in the payment process (e.g. as a result of an unauthorised debit of a cardholder 
account) and may reflect inadequate safety arrangements. According to the ECB, mitigation 
of  these  risks  supposes  appropriate  measures  to  ensure:  proper  security  management; 
protection of sensitive data or devices during manufacturing and distribution of cards; secure 
initiation and operation of transactions (also in the online environment); secure and reliable 
clearing and settlement; business continuity; and control of outsourcing
18. 
4.  MAIN PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO PAYMENT FRAUD  
Further  to  the  legislative  developments,  several  initiatives  regarding  the  prevention  of 
payment fraud have been undertaken in recent times, in most cases directly by the payment 
industry. This section will present the state of play regarding preventive measures, first with 
regard to face to face situations (4.1), then with regard to non-face to face situations (4.2). The 
question of fraud detection tools will also be briefly addressed (4.3). 
4.1.  Face to face situations  
4.1.1.  EMV implementation  
Face  to  face  situations  essentially  concern  payment  cards.  In  recent  years,  the  payment 
industry has been addressing fraud in these situations by increasing the security features of the 
payment instruments: e.g. the movement towards the chip and PIN technology  (so called 
EMV
19) as transaction authentication method in payment cards.  
The EMV deployment is addressing two traditional types of fraud: the misuse of lost and 
stolen cards and the counterfeiting and subsequent use of counterfeit cards. The use of lost or 
                                                 
17  See  ECB  press  release  of  11  January  2008  ("Oversight  Framework  for  Card  Payment  Schemes  – 
Standards").  
18  See ECB, Oversight framework for card payment schemes – standards (January 2008), in particular 
pages 7, 8, 11 and seq.  
19  The EMV (Europay-Mastercard-VISA) standard is the de facto standard for microchips and terminals in 
the payment market.  
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stolen cards in face to face situations in Europe has substantially diminished in recent years
20 
thanks to the introduction by the payment industry of the chip and PIN
21 technology: when 
this technology will be fully deployed, criminals will no longer be able to conduct face to face 
transactions in Europe based on the simple presentation of the lost or stolen card, as they 
would  need  the  PIN  to  authenticate  the  transaction.  The  EPC  recommended  the 
implementation  of  the  so-called  EMV  standard  in  Europe.  As  of  end  2007,  56%  of  the 
payment cards issued by EU based banks use the EMV chip, 59% of the points of sale are 
capable of conducting EMV secure transactions and 72% of the ATMs in the EU are equipped 
with  EMV  technology  (although  there  are  significant  country  differences)
22.  Work  is 
progressing towards full migration in time for SEPA (2010). 
The main weakness of the EMV roll out is the fact that the magnetic stripe is still maintained 
in EMV equipped cards, essentially because cards tend to be internationally accepted and the 
EMV technology is not necessarily deployed in other world regions or not at the same pace. 
To the extent that the magnetic stripe can be counterfeited (which is not the case of the EMV 
chip to date), payment cards are still vulnerable.  
4.1.2.  Skimming fraud 
The main threat at this stage is the so-called skimming fraud, which has increased in recent 
years
23. In this situation, the card's magnetic stripe is copied in payment terminals or, more 
often, in ATMs or in unattended payment terminals (for example those in petrol stations). 
Criminals install handmade skimming devices on the card slot and copy the data stored in the 
magnetic stripe. The copied data is often remotely transmitted (in some cases in real time) to 
other members of the criminal group and used for the production of counterfeit cards. These 
cards are then either used in non-EMV terminals (either in Europe or in countries where the 
EMV technology has not been implemented) or for non-face to face payments (e.g. mostly 
Internet transactions). Additionally, in some cases, criminals are able to capture the PIN code 
of the cardholders when copying cards (for instance by attaching mini-cameras above the 
keypad in ATMs) and then are able to further use the counterfeit cards in European ATMs to 
withdraw cash (to the extent that non-EMV transactions may be still be accepted within the 
EU even if both card and terminal are EMV capable).  
The FPEG produced a report in 2006 on the security issues related to ATMs and point of sale 
terminals,  in  particular  in  relation  to  skimming  attacks.  The  report  presents  some 
recommendations,  mostly  addressed  to  the  payment  industry,  on  how  to  mitigate  these 
attacks. Indeed, the payment industry is, through the EAST group
24, monitoring the skimming 
                                                 
20  See for instance the presentations of the EPC Card Fraud Prevention Task Force at the FPEG meetings 
of 2006 and 2007. 
21  Personal identification number to be introduced in order to validate a face-to-face transaction. 
22  See presentation by the EPC Card Fraud Task Force at the FPEG meeting of 19.12.2007 
23  According to a press release by EAST (see following footnote) of 23 March 2007, in 2006 there were 
4571 reported card skimming attacks, which resulted in total losses of just over €305 million euros. 
Compared to 2005 figures, there  were increases of 23%  in the  number of attacks and 30% in the 
reported losses. See also the presentations of the EPC Card Fraud Prevention Task Force at the FPEG 
meetings of 2006 and 2007. See also Europol, Annual Report (2006), in particular the section on liaison 
bureaux activities (pages 32 and seq.). 
24  European  ATM  Security  Team  (EAST).  Founded  in  February  2004,  EAST  is  a  ‘not-for-profit’ 
organisation whose members are committed to gathering information from, and disseminating EAST 
outputs to, ATM deployers and networks within their countries/regions. While the main focus of EAST  
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threat  and  the  security  efforts  in  ATMs.  Additionally,  the  EPC  is  currently  considering 
recommending additional measures to counter this type of fraud, notably by improving the 
security  features  of  ATMs  and  similar  unattended  payment  terminals  and/or  establishing 
incentives  for  acquiring  banks  with  a  view  to  eliminating  the  acceptance  of  non-EMV 
transactions when both the card and the payment terminal are EMV capable
25.  
In any case, lost, stolen and counterfeit cards can still be used in non-face to face situations, in 
particular for Internet payments and telephone orders (see section 4.2). 
4.1.3.  Card Stop numbers 
Under the 2004-2007 Action Plan, it was foreseen to continue the discussions with a view to 
implementing a single telephone number in the EU for the notification by users of lost and 
stolen  payment  cards.  Prompt  notification  of  the  loss  or  theft  of  a  card  is  important  for 
consumers as, in accordance with the recent Payment Services Directive, they cease to be 
liable for any fraud losses after such notification
26. Indeed, this directive also contains an 
obligation for card payment users to notify the issuing banks of any loss or theft of the card
27. 
This notification is equally important for banks, which can take immediate action to stop 
financial losses. Remembering which number(s) to call to report lost and stolen cards may be 
difficult if the customer owns more cards, is travelling abroad or is in a situation of distress. 
Therefore, a single telephone number for declaring lost and stolen payment cards in Europe 
would be of significant value to citizens. 
On 15 February 2007, the Commission adopted a decision reserving the whole range of phone 
numbers beginning with "116"
28. These numbers should be freephone numbers (e.g. the cost 
of the call should not be borne by the citizen) and should be only used for "harmonised 
services  of  social  value"  in  accordance  with  the  definition  and  conditions  set  out  in  the 
Commission  Decision.  Immediately  after  adoption  of  the  Commission  Decision,  the 
Commission  services  launched  a  public  consultation  inviting  interested  parties  to  propose 
specific 6-digits numbers in the sub-range 1160XX and 1161XX to be reserved for specific 
services. An interested party introduced a request to consider card (or more generally payment 
instrument) stop services as services of social value and to consider reserving 116116 for 
these services. The decision to allocate a 116 number to card stop services has still not been 
                                                                                                                                                         
is on  ATMs, the Group also focuses on all payment  terminals  that have a direct impact on crime 
perpetrated at ATM locations. See www.eas-team.eu.  
25  In  principle,  by  the  end  2010  magnetic  stripe-based  transactions  will  no  longer  be  SEPA  Card 
Framework compliant.  
26  Article 61(4) regarding liability indicates that "the payer shall not bear any financial consequences 
resulting  from  use  of  the  lost,  stolen  or  misappropriated  payment  instrument  after  notification  in 
accordance with Article 56(1)(b), except where he has acted fraudulently. Article 61(5) further indicates 
that "if the payment service provider does not provide appropriate means for the notification at all times 
of a lost, stolen or misappropriated payment instrument as required by Article 57(1)(c), the payer shall 
not be liable for the financial consequences resulting  from use of that payment instrument (except 
where he has acted fraudulently)". 
27  Article 56(1)(b) requires the payment service user to notify the payment service provider (or the entity 
specified by the latter, without undue delay on becoming aware of loss, theft or misappropriation of the 
payment instrument or of its unauthorised use. Article 57(1)(c) requires the payment service provider to 
ensure that appropriate means are available at all times to enable the payment service user to make a 
notification pursuant to Article 56(1)(b) [or to request unblocking pursuant to Article 55(4)]. 
28  Commission Decision 2007/116/EC of 15 February 2007 on reserving the national numbering range 
beginning  with  '116'  for  harmonised  numbers  for  harmonised  services  of  social  value,  OJ  L  49, 
17.2.2007, p.30.  
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taken by the Commission pending, inter alia, the verification of the payment industry interest 
in using such a single freephone number in other Member States.  
4.2.  Non-face to face situations  
4.2.1.  Card-not-present fraud 
The EMV success (see above) has resulted in an overall decrease of card fraud losses
29, but at 
the same time generated a de facto shift of payment card fraud towards remote (e.g. non-face 
to face) situations, mostly in the Internet environment: the so-called card-not-present fraud. 
This type of fraud is increasing in Europe
30 and is considered to constitute the highest threat 
for payment cards
31. 
Card-not-present  fraud  consists  in  the  misuse  of  illegally  obtained  card  data  in  mail  and 
telephone orders, but essentially in Internet payments (e-commerce
32). The growth of this type 
of fraud has additionally given rise to the development of websites dedicated to the massive 
selling of illegally obtained
33 card data with a view to their fraudulent use
34.  
Criminals have been taking advantage of gaps in the security requirements applied by the 
payment  industry  and  e-commerce  sites  in  relation  to  the  acceptance  of  (credit)  card 
transactions: not all merchants have systematically been collecting the card security codes 
(the  numbers  on  the  back  of  the  card,  also  known  as  CVX2  numbers,  which  cannot  be 
skimmed) while payment card issuers have not systematically rejected transactions with false 
or no card security code. The airlines/travel agencies and gaming/gambling sectors have been 
identified as weak areas. 
In reply to this threat, the EPC recommends ensuring the use of the card security codes as 
from January 2008 (unless other fraud prevention methods leading to similar or better results 
can be applied). This wider use of the codes should lead, in the present circumstances, to a 
large  diminution  of  fraud.  Additionally,  the  payment  industry  is  providing  incentives  to 
merchants and cardholders for the use of enhanced secure verification methods in internet 
payments (so called 3D Secure), which are voluntary at this stage. The payment industry has 
also engaged in recent times in specific dialogue with airlines on fraud issues, as this is the 
sector in which fraud is higher.  
                                                 
29  Cf. EPC, Resolution: Preventing Card Fraud in the New SEPA Environment, (March 2007). See also 
the presentations of the EPC Card Fraud Task Force at the FPEG meetings of 2006 and 2007. 
30  See the presentations of the EPC Card Fraud Task Force at the FPEG meetings of 2006 and 2007. 
31  See Europol, Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), June 2007, p.17: "Neither will increased 
security solve all problems for debit and credit cards. In fact, even if EU fully migrates to chip, PIN and 
secure code, the card data could be used elsewhere, in a simpler manner, in the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, the main threat for “plastic“ payments is no longer represented by counterfeit cards, but 
by card-not-present (CNP) payments, where credit card transactions are carried out on the phone or on 
the Internet."  
32  Payment cards are still the most popular payment instrument for e-commerce payments. 
33  By skimming, hacking false merchant sites, staff fraud or other method. 
34  See generally Europol, High Tech Crimes within the EU: old crimes new tools, new crimes new tools – 
Threat Assessment 2007 (public version), August 2007, p. 27 and seq.  
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4.2.2.  E-banking fraud  
E-banking fraud also takes place in a remote transaction environment. The main threat relates 
to account takeover fraud. Bank customer data is obtained through spoofing
35, phishing
36, 
pharming
37, trojans
38 (or other viruses and similar  malware), hacking
39 of databases, staff 
fraud etc. Data illegally obtained is then used, for instance, to empty the account through 
credit transfers
40.  
One way to address e-banking is to increase the level of security associated with customer 
authentication methods. Currently, banks tend to consider the security features of their e-
banking  systems  as  part  of  their  commercial  policy.  Hence,  contrary  to  the  situation  for 
payment  cards,  there  are  no  minimum  market  standards,  although  there  is  a  (slow) 
convergence of authentication methods (see also section 6.3)
41. In this context, the European 
Payments Council, encouraged by the ECB, has recently undertaken a survey on security 
issues related to customer authentication (customer-to-business) with regard to direct debit 
and credit transfer schemes. The objective is to produce a threat assessment (excluding card 
schemes) with a view to agreeing (possibly in 2008) on some best practices to recommend to 
the banking industry
42.  
4.2.3.  Identity theft/fraud and generally cyber crime 
Both card-not-present fraud and e-banking fraud are, de facto, variations of the wider identity 
theft/fraud  phenomenon
43,  where  the  non-face  to  face  dimension  is  important  and  whose 
impact  seems  to  be  growing.  In  the  2004-2007  Action  Plan,  the  Commission  already 
highlighted  this  problem  and  stressed  the  need  to  strengthen  business  and  consumer 
confidence  regarding  non-cash  means  of  payment.  At  the  same  time,  to  the  extent  that 
payment  fraud  is  increasingly  committed  using  electronic  communications  networks,  it  is 
                                                 
35  In the context of network security, spoofing refers to a situation in  which a person or programme 
successfully masquerades as another by falsifying data and thereby gains an illegitimate advantage. 
36  Phishing is an attack perpetrated through the mass e-mailing of a message designed to appear as if it 
originates from a legitimate source. The message contains some suitable pretext for fraud, such as a 
bank requesting that the recipient update his online banking account information. The message may 
contain a link to a counterfeit copy of the legitimate Web page of the targeted bank. As part of this web 
page, the phisher spoofs a form that asks the e-mail recipient to provide his proprietary data (i.e. bank 
account number, personal identification number (PIN), valid credit card number and expiration date). 
37  Pharming is the exploitation of a vulnerability in the DNS server software that allows a hacker to 
acquire the Domain Name for a site, and to redirect traffic to that web site to another web site. DNS 
servers  are  the  machines  responsible  for  resolving  internet  names  into  their  real  addresses-  the 
"signposts" of the internet. 
38  A malicious program that is disguised as legitimate software. 
39  Hacking refers to electronically breaking into databases where financial or other personal data is copied. 
This data is subsequently fraudulently used. 
40  See generally Europol, High Tech Crimes within the EU: old crimes new tools, new crimes new tools – 
Threat Assessment 2007 (public version), August 2007, p. 27 and seq. 
41  For a description of different types of authentication methods, see generally European Commission, 
Study on user identification methods in card payments, e-payments and mobile payments (November 
2007), Work Package 1, pages 19 and seq. See work package 2 regarding the use of authentication 
methods and work package 5 for an overall summary. 
42  This  could  lead  to  the  update  or  the  replacement  of  the  ECBS  (European  Committee  for  Banking 
Standards) Security Guidelines for e-banking: application of Basel risk management principles, TR411 
(version2), August 2004. 
43  In this paper, no distinction will be made between identity theft and identity fraud.   
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becoming a category of the wider cyber crime problem. These issues will be examined in 
section 5.2 below.  
4.3.  Fraud detection tools and the processing of personal data 
The activities of cardholders and card acceptors are permanently monitored in real time by 
fraud detection tools operated by card issuers with a view to detecting fraud (for instance 
abnormal transactions) and being able to react to it in a timely manner
44. This data processing 
is considered essential by the payment industry in the fraud prevention context
45.  
The recent Directive on Payment Services recognises that in order to facilitate effective fraud 
prevention across the Community, Member States shall permit the processing of personal data 
by payment systems and payment service providers when this is necessary to safeguard the 
prevention, investigation and detection of payment fraud
46.  
At the same time, to the extent that the operation of those fraud detection tools implies the 
processing of personal data, these activities should be conducted in compliance with the strict 
safeguards  set  in  European  privacy  legislation
47.  As  a  result,  the  desire  by  the  payment 
industry to process data beyond the card issuer sphere (for instance at card scheme level in a 
SEPA wide area) in order to increase its effectiveness is not exempt from problems. The 
FPEG discussed the data sharing issue in a number of different meetings and a report on the 
limits to the sharing of personal data for fraud prevention purposes was prepared by the FPEG 
secretariat in December 2006.  
The question of the sharing of fraud related data will inevitably arise in the context of the 
implementation  of  the  payment  services  directive,  and  notably  from  the  perspective  of 
achieving a level playing field at SEPA level. It should be stressed that there are already 
innovative solutions in some Member States such as Italy, where the public authorities act as 
trusted third parties for the pooling of data in full respect of the national data protection law
48.  
It should be noted that the question of data sharing beyond the individual bank is of lesser 
importance in the context of e-banking fraud, where there normally will be little need (if any) 
for the bank to share fraud related data with others. 
                                                 
44  Card issuers and acquirers also operate other types of databases which contain information on fraud that 
already took place: e.g. databases of terminated merchants or of fraudulent transactions. 
45  The  ECB  seems  to  also  implicitly  support  this  kind  of  fraud  detection  tools.  See  ECB,  Oversight 
framework for card payment schemes – standards (January 2008), pages 11. 
46  Article 69 of the Directive on Payment Services. 
47  Directive  95/46/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  October  1995  on  the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data. 
48  For a description of the new Italian database, see the presentation at the FPEG meeting of June 2007 – 
available at the FPEG website.  
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5.  PROSECUTING PAYMENT FRAUD 
5.1.  The need for effective penalties 
The deterrent effect of criminal penalties for payment fraud offences should be the first key 
element of the fight against fraud. Since 2001, Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA
49 
has  required  Member  States  to  criminalise  payment  fraud  and  to  establish  effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, including, at least in serious cases, penalties 
involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition. The Commission presented 
in April 2004 and February 2006 two reports on the measures taken by the Member States to 
comply  with  this  Framework  Decision
50.  Some  stakeholders  have  the  perception  that  the 
penalties  applied  in  practice  at  national  level  in  this  field  are  generally  too  low  to  be 
dissuasive
51. Europol signalled in 2005 that national criminal laws are extremely lenient vis-à-
vis  fraud,  thus  inviting  organised  crime  to  resort  more  and  more  to  this  profitable  and 
relatively  safe  type  of  crime,  fraud  being  considered  the  archetypal  low-risk  high-profit 
crime
52.  
5.2.  Police and judicial responses 
The effective prosecution of criminals is the second key element of the fight against payment 
fraud. There are, however, practical difficulties for the law enforcement authorities to ensure a 
fast reaction against fraud.  
First of all, criminal conduct in relation to payment fraud is becoming highly technical and 
sophisticated. As a result, obtaining enough evidence to prove the actual criminal conduct is 
not always easy. The 2004-2007 Action Plan suggested exploring whether dedicated police 
forces could better contribute to the fight against payment fraud. It appears in this regard that 
the current trend in national police forces is to create specialised units to deal with cyber 
crime,  including  payment  fraud  committed  in  this  environment,  which  is  the  fastest 
developing type of fraud.  
Additionally,  in  large  scale  payment  fraud  there  are  normally  significant  cross-border 
components,  while  law  enforcement  authorities  are  limited  by  traditional  territorial 
constraints: card data is generally obtained in one country but employed in another. This 
cross-border  dimension  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  large  scale  payment  fraud 
appears to be committed by transnational organised crime and/or specialised ethnic groups 
with substantial mobility across borders
53. Europol provides assistance, including analytical 
work, to national police forces in this fight, focusing in particular on skimming and carding 
                                                 
49  Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of 
non-cash means of payment, OJ L 149, 2.6.2001, p.1. 
50  European  Commission,  30.4.2004,  Report  of  the  Commission  based  on  Article  14  of  the  Council 
Framework  Decision  of  28  May  2001  combating  fraud  and  counterfeiting  of  non-cash  means  of 
payment, COM(2004) 346 final; and 20.2.2006, Second report based on Article 14 of the Council 
Framework  Decision  of  28  May  2001  combating  fraud  and  counterfeiting  of  non-cash  means  of 
payment, COM(2006)65 final. 
51  See FPEG reports on ATM and POS security and on Identity theft/fraud.  
52  Europol, 2005 EU Organised Crime Report (Public Version), pages 7 and 32. 
53  See for instance Europol, 2005 EU Organised Crime Report (Public Version), pages 5, 7, 30; 2004 EU 
Organised Crime Report (Open Version), pages 8 and seq.  
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projects
54. Additionally, in order to enhance cross-border police and judicial cooperation and 
assistance,  a  Joint  Investigations  Team  network  supported  by  Europol  and  Eurojust  was 
created in 2005
55. There have already been encouraging results leading to the disbanding of 
specialised criminal gangs in payment fraud
56. It should be noted, however, that the legal 
framework and developments at EU level regarding this issue are not payment fraud specific.  
Stakeholders also believe that better enforcement of the procedures on freezing and recovery 
of proceeds from fraud is needed. This necessity has also been recognised at EU level several 
times, which has led to the recent adoption of legislative tools which should help in this 
process. The Council adopted in 2005 a Council Framework on confiscation of crime-related 
proceeds, instrumentalities and property
57. The aim of this framework decision is to ensure 
that  all  Member  States  have  effective  rules  governing  the  confiscation  of  proceeds  from 
crime, inter alia, in relation to the onus of proof regarding the source of assets held by a 
person convicted of an offence related to organised crime. In 2007 the Commission published 
a report on the implementation of this framework decision
58. Another Council Decision was 
adopted  in  December  2007  concerning  the  cooperation  between  Member  States'  Asset 
Recovery  Offices in the field of tracing and identifying proceeds from, or other property 
related  to,  crime
59.  This  decision  enhances  cooperation  between  the  relevant  national 
authorities involved in the tracing of illicit proceeds and other property that may become 
liable  to  confiscation  by  creating  national  Asset  Recovery  Offices  and  allowing  them  to 
communicate directly. Europol and Eurojust are cooperating with national authorities in this 
area
60. On a wider geographical scale, a new Council of Europe Convention on laundering, 
search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on financing of terrorism was 
adopted on 3 May 2005
61. This Convention, which specifically includes fraud as a predicate 
offence to money laundering, should enhance cross-border cooperation between EU countries 
and European non-EU countries in this field. The Commission submitted in September 2005 a 
proposal  for  a  Council  decision  concerning  the  signature,  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Community, of this Convention
62.  
                                                 
54  See Europol, Annual Report (2006), p. 14. See also the cases reported in Europol Annual Reports in 
relation to the Liaison bureaux activities. 
55  See Europol press release of 30 November 2007 ("Eurojust and Europol promoting joint investigation 
teams").  
56  See  for  instance  Europol  press  releases  of  20  June  2007  ("Europol  supports  Italian  Carabinieri  in 
combating an international credit card fraud network") and of 15 March 2007 ("Successful co-operation 
and co-ordination activities have led to the dismantling of a credit card fraud network in Romania"). See 
also the cases reported in Europol Annual Reports in relation to the Liaison bureaux activities. 
57  Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related 
Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property, OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, p.49. 
58  COM(2007)805 final, of 17.12.2007. 
59  Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between Asset Recovery 
Offices  of  the  Member  States  in  the  field  of  tracing  and  identification  of  proceeds  from,  or  other 
property related to, crime; OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, p.103. 
60  See Europol, Financial and Property Crimes, January 2006 p.1. 
61  Convention n°198. The text of the Convention and the state of play of the ratifications is available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=198&CM=8&DF=2/6/2008&CL=
ENG. This convention will replace the previous 1990 Convention (Convention n°141) on the same 
subject. Pursuant to the 1990 Convention, the Council adopted on 26 June 2001 a Framework Decision 
on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities 
and the proceeds of crime; OJ L 182, 5.7.2001, p. 1. The Commission has prepared two reports on the 
implementation of this Decision: the first of 5 April 2004 (COM(2004)230final), the second of 21 
February 2006 (COM(2006)72final. 
62  COM(2005)426, of 13.09.2005. The formal Council decision has not yet been adopted.   
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5.3.  Assisting tools 
Europol continues to provide regular specialised training, in cooperation with payment card 
schemes,  to  national  law  enforcement  authorities  on  operational  aspects  of  payment  card 
fraud,  in  particular  on  skimming  and  hi-tech  payment  card  crime  over  the  Internet.  This 
specialised training improves the expertise and the financial investigation capacity of the law 
enforcement authorities in this field
63.  
6.  CHALLENGES AHEAD 
6.1.  Increasing the knowledge of the problem 
Understanding the nature and the extent of the problem is of primary importance in order to 
evaluate the risks, implement the appropriate measures to counter fraud and measure their 
effectiveness.  Referring  to  payment  card  fraud,  Europol  indicates  that  it  is  still  an 
underestimated  problem,  especially  its  connections  with  other  types  of  serious  crime
64. 
Nevertheless, the quality of statistics providing a picture of payment fraud at EU level could 
be largely improved, as should statistics on criminal justice in general. 
Concerning payment cards, the EPC is developing an anti-fraud database that would integrate 
aggregated  statistics  on  fraud  covering  both  national  and  SEPA  wide  transactions
65.  This 
database is to be operated, in full respect of privacy protection rules, by a neutral trusted third 
party
66.  The  database  should  normally  be  operational  in  2008.  A  feasibility  study  and  a 
prototype have been prepared by a group of European card schemes, with the support of the 
Community Programme AGIS
67.  
Regarding e-banking fraud and notably phishing, victims, in particular financial institutions, 
are reluctant to report cases
68. The risk of damaging the reputation of the firm is carefully 
considered  by  financial  institutions  before  deciding  to  disclose  the  attacks.  Other 
considerations play a role, inter alia the different approaches to the problem and different 
goals pursued by the financial institutions and by the police themselves. As a result, there is 
no reliable picture of the extent of the problem. It should be noted that in the case of phishing, 
financial institutions are by far the most targeted businesses by criminals. For Europol, this is 
one of the biggest constraints which impedes a real assessment of computer crimes. 
In 2006 the Commission addressed the need to improve the statistics in the area of crimes and 
criminal prosecution by launching an ambitious 2006-2010 action plan on developing an EU 
strategy to measure  crime and criminal justice
  69. The Action Plan aims at establishing a 
                                                 
63  See generally the annual reports of Europol.  
64  Europol, Annual report (2006), p. 14. 
65  EPC, Resolution: Preventing Card Fraud in the New SEPA Environment, (March 2007). 
66  In  reply  to  the  Eurosystem's  view  of  a  "SEPA  for  Cards",  the  EPC  suggests  that  the  Eurosystem 
analyses the feasibility of acting as a trusted third-party for such data collection and its reporting. See, 
EPC, A response to the Eurosystem's view of a "SEPA for Cards", 11 April 2007, Doc. EPC071/07.  
67  See Annex 1 for further detail. 
68  See Europol, High Tech Crimes within the EU: old crimes new tools, new crimes new tools – Threat 
Assessment 2007 (public version), August 2007, p. 8-9. See also European Commission, Study on user 
identification methods in card payments, e-payments and mobile payments (November 2007), work 
package 5, page 39.  
69  Communication from the Commission of 7 August 2006, Developing a comprehensive and coherent 
EU strategy to measure crime and criminal justice: An EU Action Plan 2006-2010, COM(2006)437.  
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methodology to develop EU statistics on crime and criminal justice that in the longer term 
will  be  comparable  between  Member  States.  The  Commission  will  support  the 
implementation of the  Action Plan through the coordinated activities of an Expert Group 
(which will identify the needs for statistical data on crime and criminal justice) and of a 
European Statistical Office Expert Group (which will produce the necessary data)
70.  
6.2.  Fighting the new threats: payment fraud, identity theft/fraud and cyber crime 
Payment fraud is a moving target. As mentioned in section 4.2, new threats appear, notably 
identity theft/fraud and, more generally, cyber crime (which includes many of the identity 
theft/fraud typologies). Community responses to these new threats have been numerous in 
recent years, either at regulatory level or by raising greater awareness. They are explained in 
more detail in the next subsections.  
6.2.1.  Payment fraud and identity theft/fraud  
The  misuse  of  personal  data  to  impersonate  somebody  else  and  abuse  of  his/her 
banking/financial services facilities is a growing concern in developed societies. Identity data 
and  supporting  documents  play  an  increasingly  important  role  in  financial  and  social 
processes and transactions, and therefore the data and the documents – rather than the persons 
themselves - increasingly become the subject of attack
71. In some EU Member States identity 
theft/fraud is among the fastest growing type of financial fraud with increased involvement of 
organised  crime.  Furthermore,  this  kind  of  fraud  has  serious  implications  for  its  victims, 
which go beyond simple financial losses, to include emotional costs and the inconvenience for 
users of "cleaning up" their name. 
As part of the awareness initiatives undertaken by the Commission services in the context of 
the 2004-2007 Action Plan, the Commission organised a High level Conference in November 
2006 on identity theft and payment fraud
72. The aim of the conference was to emphasize the 
importance  of  a  wider  involvement  of  policy  makers  and  high  ranking  representatives  of 
national administrations in this issue.  
One of the main conclusions of the 2006 Conference was the need for a better understanding 
of  the  problem.  A  common  definition  of  identity  theft  in  the  EU  would  be  desirable 
(irrespective of the modus operandi and technical means used to compromise personal data), 
                                                 
70  The Commission also adopted in 2006 a Decision establishing an experts group on the policy needs for 
data on crime and criminal justice,  with  the possibility of creating  specialised subgroups. Its  main 
objective consists of assisting the Commission in identifying the needs for development of common 
indicators and tools designed to measure crime and criminal justice. This will also involve developing 
common indicators and other data needs specifically from the perspective of users of statistical data. 
See Commission Decision 2006/581/EC of 7 August 2006 setting up a group of experts on the policy 
needs for data on crime and criminal justice, OJ L 234, 29.8.2006, p.29. 
71  See  Europol,  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  (2007),  p.17:  "In  a  world  characterised  by 
increasing  anonymity  and  bureaucracy,  documents  are  gaining  more  importance  than  the  persons 
carrying them. Without a complete set of documents a living person does not officially exist, and at the 
same time a non-living, virtual person can cash money and social benefits by means of apparently 
genuine documents. Through them certain rights, entitlements and services are attributed to the bearer. 
Such a situation is and will be thoroughly exploited by organised crime. […] Identity fraudsters can 
steal the personal and financial data of an existing victim or fabricate a totally fictitious person with the 
aim of using debit and credit cards – sometimes after having opened a bank account – and spending 
money they do not have." 
72  www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/conference_integrity/index_en.htm   
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as well as more statistical data in order to quantify the extent and the impact of identity theft. 
This  should  allow  for  a  better  tackling  of  identity  theft  at  EU  level,  in  particular  by 
intensifying public-private cooperation and coordinating efforts to raise awareness. In this 
context, a similar high level conference was organised in November 2007 by the Portuguese 
presidency of the EU to examine the identity theft problem from a wider perspective. This 
conference reached similar conclusions
73. Two follow-up activities to the 2007 conference 
were launched: (i) a glossary, to be built up, taking into due account the terminology already 
existing in reference studies and reports; and (ii) an analytical study on identity systems.  
At the 2006 conference, support was also expressed for new EU penal legislation providing 
that the specific behaviours which concur to commit identity theft (including phishing and 
other forms of cybercrime) are criminal offences in all EU Member States. Following this, the 
Commission  launched  in  2007  an  external  comparative  study  on  the  legal  instruments  to 
combat organised crime related to identity theft in the EU Members States. Depending on the 
results of this study, expected for autumn 2008, the Commission may consider harmonising 
EU criminal legislation on identity theft in order to ensure that identity theft is a criminal 
offence  in  its  own  right  in  all  EU  Member  States  and  to  introduce  effective  dissuasive 
sanctions
74. The need to strengthen investigations and prosecution through law enforcement 
was also emphasized at the conference. 
Facilitating the reporting by victims of identity theft was also discussed at the conference
75. 
Participants suggested the creation of an EU contact point where communications related to 
identity  theft  could  be  sent  for  possible  follow up.  Similarly, the  2004-2007  Action  Plan 
suggested exploring the merits of establishing such a contact point. This examination is still 
pending.  
Assisting the private sector in the verification of identity documents was also highlighted as a 
desirable  objective.  On  this  issue,  an  EU  database  disseminating  information  on  security 
features  of  authentic  identity  and  travel  documents  to  the  public  recently  entered  into 
operation.  It  is  the  "Public  Register  of  Authentic  Identity and  Travel  Documents  Online" 
(previously known as the FADO project). The PRADO database is hosted by the general 
secretariat of the Council
76. 
The FPEG also discussed the implications of identity theft/fraud for payment services. This 
was ultimately reflected in an FPEG report disclosed in 2007 which provides an overview of 
the identity theft/fraud problems in the payment and retail banking areas, whilst recognising 
that the effects of identity theft/fraud go well beyond the financial sector. The report outlines 
the main risks and the vulnerabilities all along the identity chain in the financial system. This 
report highlighted in particular the importance of maintaining the integrity of the identity 
chain. Currently the weakest links of the chain are: the customer's computer, the Internet 
Service Providers, the data storage service providers acting as third parties, as well as the 
databases  operated  by  merchants  and  public  authorities.  This  report  also  highlighted  that 
although technology is part of the solution, it is not the only solution. Better education of the 
                                                 
73  This  conference  was  wider  in  scope  and  its  conclusions  covered  a  wider  range  of  issues: 
www.idfraudconference-pt2007.org  
74  See also the Communication from the Commission of 22.5.2007, Towards a general policy on the fight 
against cyber crime, COM(2007267final, p.10. 
75  See section 5.1 above on the reluctance of financial institutions to report fraud cases because of the 
reputational implications. 
76  www.consilium.europa.eu/prado/EN/homeIndex.html   
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weak parties (citizens, SMEs) in the use of the Internet, as well as providing care for the 
victims, are also necessary, in order to improve trust. 
The  identity  theft/fraud  problem  has  implications  for  the  wider  perspective  of  identity 
management. During the past years there have been a number of initiatives from industry, 
academia and international organisations to define user-centric identity management concepts, 
that minimise the scope for identity abuse and shift the balance to the user to make essential 
decisions about the use of his/her identity information. The Commission has funded research 
projects  in  this  area  through  the  6
th  Framework  Research  Programme  (FP6),  notably  the 
PRIME
77 and FIDIS
78 projects. It remains to be seen whether it is possible at this stage to 
develop standardised user-centric meta-level identity definitions. This could be the basis for a 
competitive market for identity providers, add customer empowerment and consumer choice, 
and open up a wide array of commercial opportunities that rely on trustworthy services.  
Recently, as part of 7
th Framework Research Programme (FP7, 2007-2013), a new set of 
information and communication technologies security projects
79 was launched. Many of these 
projects  directly  target  data  and  privacy  protective  identity  management  (for  example 
PRIMELIFE, PRISM, SWIFT, TAS3) or focus on specific authentication technologies, such 
as  revocable  biometrics (biometrics  are  increasingly  used  for  authentication  purposes  and 
therefore  could  become  a  target  for  criminals,  see  for  example  the  projects  TURBINE, 
MOBIO). Other projects focus on advanced encryption technologies for protecting data or 
devices (ECRYPT II, TECOM), or target securing networks, including mobile networks that 
are increasingly used for financial transactions, and securing business and data policies (for 
example CONSEQUENCE, MASTER, AWISSENET, INTERSECTION). 
In this context, the Commission is also sponsoring research on and promotion of the use of 
interoperable  electronic  identities  (eID)
80.  A  large  scale  pilot  project,  STORCK,  is  being 
considered to be funded in 2008, through the ICT-PSP programme, with almost 20 Member 
States in order to promote interoperability of eID for government services (with 10 Million € 
financed by the ICT-PSP of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme). 
The  Commission  is  also  working  on  interoperability  issues  by  establishing  a  "European 
Interoperability  Framework  for  pan-European  eGovernment  services"  through  the  IDABC 
programme  (Interoperable  Delivery  of  European  eGovernment  Services  to  public 
Administrations, Business and Citizens)
81.  
                                                 
77  PRIME is a research project which aims at developing a working prototype of a privacy-enhancing 
Identity Management System. To foster market adoption, novel solutions for managing identities will 
be demonstrated in challenging real-world scenarios, e.g., from Internet Communication, Airline and 
Airport  Passenger  Processes,  Location-Based  Services  and  Collaborative  e-Learning.  The  work  on 
prototype development is a means to validate its new scientific and research results. See www.prime-
project.eu.  
78  FIDIS (Future of Identity  in the Information Society) is  a network of excellence  supported by the 
European  Community  under  the  6
th  Framework  Programme  for  Research  and  Technological 
Development. See www.fidis.net. 
Work Package 5 of the FIDIS project deals with identity theft. See in particular deliverable 5.1 (A survey on 
legislation on ID theft in the EU and a number of other countries, May 2005) and deliverable 5.2b (ID-
related crime: towards a common ground for interdisciplinary research, May 2006.  
79  www.cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/security/projects_en.html  
80  See  generally:  www.ec.europa.eu/information_society/soccul/egov/index_en.htm  and 
www.ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/index_en.htm  
81  www.ec.europa.eu/idabc  
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6.2.2.  Payment fraud and cyber crime 
Criminal activities are becoming increasingly sophisticated and internationalised, with greater 
involvement  of  organised  crime.  As  stated  in  the  latest  Europol  organised  crime  threat 
assessment, technology is a facilitator in various traditional crime types, including financial 
fraud. Furthermore, its abuse has also created altogether new forms of crime, in particular 
cross-border crime committed via the Internet
82. Indeed, nowadays, the main target in high 
technology crimes is the violation of privacy and the theft of data
83, and the use of the Internet 
is the main vehicle for facilitating this criminal process
84. Furthermore, it cannot be excluded 
that cyber crime is progressively becoming technologically more sophisticated (for instance 
by  increasingly  relying  on  malicious  software  capable  of  deviating  on-line  financial 
transactions  etc.)  rather  than  relying  on  social  engineering  techniques  (such  as  phishing), 
which can be more efficiently tackled by improving consumer education
85. 
In  tackling  security  challenges  for  the  information  society,  the  European  Community  has 
developed a three-pronged approach. First, the EU institutions continue to develop policy 
with  a  view  to  improving  network  and  information  security,  which  continues  to  pose 
challenging problems. In 2005 the Council adopted a framework decision requesting Member 
States  to  criminalise  certain  attacks  against  information  systems
86.  The  Commission  also 
presented in 2006 a specific communication on network and information security, identifying 
risks and possible work streams for the future
87. The establishment of ENISA
88 in 2004 has 
also been a major step forward in the EU's efforts to respond to the challenges relating to 
network and information security.  
Secondly, the regulatory framework for electronic communications includes security-related 
provisions. In particular, under the European privacy legislation
89, administrative authorities 
have  the  power  to  act  against  certain  illegal  practices  related  to  payment  fraud,  notably: 
unlawful  access  to  terminal  equipment,  either  to store  information  –  such  as  adware  and 
                                                 
82  For example, spoofing, phishing and hacking are relatively independent crime types, the origin of which 
is  traced  back  to  the  widespread  use  of  information  technology  and  the  Internet.  See  Europol, 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (2007), p.18 
83  This  may  be  done  in  several  ways,  such  as  hacking,  phreaking,  cracking  of  passwords,  phishing, 
identity theft, pharming, the spread of malicious codes etc.  
84  See Europol, High Tech Crimes within the EU: old crimes new tools, new crimes new tools – Threat 
Assessment 2007 (public version), August 2007, p. 4. 
85  According to Europol (with reference to phishing, pharming, vishing and smishing), "one of the key 
points in combating social engineering is education: various studies have stated that in most cases, the 
incorrect behaviour of the user has made it easier for the perpetrator of the crime." See Europol, High 
Tech Crimes within the EU: old crimes new tools, new crimes new tools – Threat Assessment 2007 
(public version), August 2007, p. 31. 
86  Framework decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems, OJ L 69, 16.3.2005, p.67. 
See in particular Articles 2 and 4 as well as recitals 3 and 4. 
87  See generally Commission Communication of 31.5.2006, A strategy for a Secure Information Society – 
"Dialogue, partnership and empowerment", COM(2006)251, in particular section 2.  
88  ENISA  was  created  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  460/2004  establishing  the  European  Network  and 
Information Security Agency, OJ L 77, 13.3.2004, p.1. The main objective of ENISA is to develop 
expertise to stimulate cooperation between the public and private sector and to provide assistance to the 
Commission and Member States in the area of network security. See generally the work programmes of 
ENISA: www.enisa.europa.eu . 
89  See  generally  the  Commission  Communication  of  15.11.2006,  On  fighting  spam,  spyware  and 
malicious software, COM(2006)688, in particular section 4.1.2.  
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spyware programs – or to access information stored on that equipment
90; and misleading users 
into giving away sensitive information such as e-banking passwords or payment card details 
by  phishing  messages
91.  This  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  is 
currently  under  review  and  in  2007  the  Commission  proposed  modifications  to  three 
directives,  including  on  security  issues
92.  The  Commission  is,  inter  alia,  proposing  that 
consumers are informed if their personal data have been compromised as a result of a breach 
of network security. 
A  particular  aspect  of  privacy  relates  to  the  prevention  of  database  hacking,  notably  by 
promoting the use of privacy enhancing technologies
93. The Commission organised a High 
Level Conference on public security, privacy and technology on 20 November 2007. The 
main part of the Conference focused on the deployment of privacy enhancing technologies 
into information and communication technologies, with a view to avoiding certain breaches of 
data  protection  rules  that  result  in  invasion  of  privacy  (and  on  identity  theft)
94.  This 
Conference  followed  a  Commission  Communication  of  May  2007  on  promoting  data 
protection by privacy enhancing technologies
95. This Communication aims at involving a vast 
array of actors, including the Commission, national authorities, industry and consumers, to 
identify demands and technical requirements for these technologies, with a view to providing 
the foundation for user-empowering privacy protection services which reconcile legal and 
technical differences across Europe through public-private partnerships. The Commission also 
announced at the Conference that it would support the development of privacy enhancing 
technologies which are heavily dependent on the evolution of information and communication 
technologies,  notably  by  providing  financial  support  under  the  Fundamental  Rights  and 
                                                 
90  See Article 5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector, OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p.37). 
91  See Article 6(a) of the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council  of  24  October  1995  on  the  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.111.195, p.31). 
92  The Commission presented a Communication on this issue in 2006 launching, at the same time, a public 
consultation on the future of the electronic communications regulatory framework. See Communication 
of the Commission of 29 June 2006, On the review of the EU Regulatory Framework for electronic 
communications  and  services,  COM(2006)334,  in  particular  section  5.5  dealing  with  network  and 
information security. In November 2007, the Commission presented a report on the outcome of this 
review,  with  a  proposal  to  modify  three  directives.  See  Communication  from  the  Commission  of 
13.11.2007,  Report  on  the  outcome  of  the  Review  of  the  EU  regulatory  framework  for  electronic 
communications networks and services in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC and Summary of the 
2007  Reform  Proposals,  COM(2007)696.  See  also  the  Commission  proposal  of  13.11.2007  for  a 
Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Directives  2002/21/EC  on  a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and services, and 2002/20/EC on 
the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2007)697.  
93  It should be noted in this context that Article 17 of the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) 
already lays down the data controller's obligation to implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures  and  to  ensure  a  level  of  security  appropriate  to  the  nature  of  the  data  and  the  risks  of 
processing  it.  The  use  of  technology  to  support  the  respect  for  legislation,  in  particular  the  data 
protection rules, is already envisaged to some extent in the ePrivacy Directive (cf. recital 46 and Article 
14(3) of Directive 2002/58). 
94  The presentations of the Conference are available at: 
www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/events/news_events_en.htm  
The Conference also addressed public security and technology issues. 
95  Communication  from  the  Commission  of  2.5.2007,  on  Promoting  Data  Protection  by  Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies (PETs), COM(2007)228.  
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Citizenship Programme (for the period 2007–2013)
96. The Commission will also conduct a 
study  on  the  economic  benefits  of  privacy  enhancing  technologies in  order  to  be  able  to 
encourage enterprises to use them. The Commission will also encourage consumers to use 
privacy enhancing technologies through awareness raising campaigns. 
Thirdly,  there  is  already  European  legislation  criminalising  cyber  fraud,  notably  payment 
fraud
97. However, the threat of high technology crime is intensified by the fact that many of 
these  new  forms  of  high  technology  crime  are  difficult  to  detect  and  control  by  law 
enforcement
98. Therefore, it becomes particularly important to involve all stakeholders in the 
fight against this phenomenon. In 2007 the Commission adopted a Communication
99 on cyber 
crime  launching  a  general  policy  initiative  to  improve  European  and  international 
coordination in the fight against cyber crime, with a particular focus on the law enforcement 
and criminal dimension. The objective of the Communication is to improve and facilitate 
coordination and cooperation between relevant authorities and experts in the EU; to develop, 
in coordination with Member States, relevant EU and international organisations and other 
stakeholders, a coherent EU policy framework on the fight against cyber crime; and to raise 
awareness of costs and dangers posed by cyber crime.  
Regarding in particular the question of financial fraud, this Communication emphasizes, in its 
action  points
100,  the  intention  to  promote  the  development  of  technical  methods  and 
procedures to fight fraud (and illegal trade) on the Internet, and also through public-private 
cooperation projects. It also announces that the Commission will continue and develop work 
in specific targeted areas, such as in the FPEG on the fight against fraud with non-cash means 
of payment in electronic networks. It is worth noting that the Communication also highlights 
the need to engage in dialogue with private operators, especially Internet service providers, 
with a view to blocking and closing down illegal Internet sites. This was also one of the 
conclusions of the 2006 Conference on identity theft (see above).  
Finally, research in the area of technologies to make information systems more secure has 
played/is  playing  a  role  in  the  fight  against  payment  fraud  and  cyber  crime  and  identity 
theft/fraud  in  general.  In  the  context  of  the  Framework  Research  Programme(s)
101,  the 
Commission  has  been  supporting  research  projects  in  relation  to  information  and 
communication  technology  security,  notably  in  connection  to  electronic  identity 
management
102, privacy protection, data loss prevention and underlying technologies such as 
encryption, trusted computing and revocable biometrics, network security and security in the 
                                                 
96  Council Decision 2007/252/JHA of 19 April 2007 establishing for the period 2007-2013 the specific 
programme Fundamental rights and citizenship as part of the General programme Fundamental Rights 
and Justice, OJ L 110, 27.4.2007, p. 33.  
97  See  notably  Articles  3  and  4  of  the  Council  Framework  Decision  2001/413/JHA  of  28  May  2001 
combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, OL 149, 2.6.2001, p.1. See also 
Article  8  (Computer-related  fraud)  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Cybercrime  of  23 
November 2001 (Convention No 185).  
98  Europol, 2005 EU organised crime report (public version), p.34. 
99  Communication from the Commission of 22.5.2007, Towards a general policy on the fight against 
cyber crime, COM(2007)267final. 
100  Op. cit., p.10. 
101  For  further  information  on  the  Research  Framework  Programmes,  see  the  Community  Research  & 
Development Information Service: www.cordis.europa.eu.  
102  See above on FIDIS and PRIME.  
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Internet of the future. These are all technologies relevant to electronic financial transactions
103 
(as well as to many other services) that critically depend on trustworthiness.  
In addition, the EU has substantially increased the resources dedicated to security research 
and  innovation.  Further  to  the  "Security  and  Safeguarding  Liberties"  programme  (with  a 
budget  of  approximately  €  750  million  for  the  period  2007-2013)
104,  which  is  further 
described in Annex 1, the 7
th Research Framework Programme (2007-2013) has, for the first 
time,  a  fully-fledged  security  research  theme  with  a  total  budget  of  €  1,4  billion).  The 
Commission presented in September 2007 a Communication on European Security Research 
and Innovation
105. This Communication emphasises the importance of public-private dialogue 
in security research in order, inter alia, to fight organised crime. See annex 1 for further 
detail. 
6.3.  Maintaining user trust in payments  
Fraud, even if it affects a minority of users, undermines the general confidence in payment 
systems. Hence, a key challenge of the work on the prevention of fraud should be to maintain 
user confidence in payments. This does not necessarily require new legislation (see above 
section 3 for the new legislative requirements, the development of SEPA standards and the 
oversight policy of the ECB) but rather the commitment of the parties involved to achieve this 
goal.  In  the  light  of  the  increasing  cyber  crime  attacks  and  the  development  of  cashless 
payments on line, this also requires trusting the information society in general.  
6.3.1.  Trust in payments 
Strong authentication methods are needed for securing transactions, in particular to counter 
remote payment fraud, and thus to enhance trust in cashless payments. As foreseen in the 
2004-2007 Action Plan, the Commission launched a study, completed in November 2007, 
which analyses, from the security and the user-friendliness point of view, the current and 
prospective cardholder verification methods on card payments, as well as user verification 
methods on e-payments and mobile payments
106. The underlying goal of the study was to 
                                                 
103  See for instance, the ANTI-PHISH project (Anticipatory Learning for Reliable Phishing Prevention) is 
directly addressing a payment fraud problem. This project aims at developing improve anticipatory anti-
phishing technologies that help to protect and secure the global email communication infrastructure. 
The scientific focus of the project is on trainable and adaptive filters that are not only able to identify 
variations of previous phishing messages, but are capable of anticipating new forms of phishing attacks. 
Such technology does not exist yet, but could greatly improve all existing methods used in spam and 
phishing filters. See generally www.antiphishresearch.org  
104  Communication of 6 April 2005 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
Establishing a framework programme on “Security and Safeguarding Liberties” for the period 2007-
2013, COM(2005)124. 
105  Communication  of  11  September  2007  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council on Public-Private Dialogue in Security Research and Innovation, COM(2007)511.  
106  European Commission, Study on user identification methods in card payments, e-payments and mobile 
payments (November 2007). The study includes 5 work packages: 1) assessment of best and most used 
identification  technologies  from  a  security  point  of  view,  including  payment  industry  barriers 
perception;  2)  assessment  of  user  friendliness  of  identification  methods,  including  user  barriers 
perception; 3) comparison of findings with previous study on user identification methods realised in 
2003;  4)  regulatory,  contractual  and  commercial  barriers  assessment  of  best  used  identification 
technologies; and 5) recommendations. This study was conducted by external contractors, following a 
call for tenders. The study is available at the European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services 
website.  
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encourage the payment industry to provide the highest economically viable level of security 
for those electronic payments but with sufficient consideration of user-friendliness.  
Nevertheless,  concerning  the  security  levels  of  authentication  methods,  the  study  shows 
(based on a survey conducted on consumers
107) that trust in the use and user friendliness of 
those  methods  do  not  always  go  hand-in-hand,  at  least  in  the  case  of  e-banking  and  e-
commerce  payments  (e.g.  non-face  to  face  payments).  Contrary  to  the  situation  for  cards 
(where  the  PIN  code  is  at  the  same  time  trusted  and  easy  to use),  in  the  case  of  online 
payments, there are trade-offs to be made: 1-factor authentication methods (such as static 
passwords) are considered to be more user friendly than 2-factor authentication methods. As 
stated in the latest Europol threat assessment
108, the perception is that the question of security 
features vs. user friendliness is clearly market-driven and is often solved by emphasising the 
latter to the detriment of the former. Although users are usually the weakest link in the chain, 
they are not necessarily given any choice on the security levels of the payment instrument.  
Involving the user is therefore important to increase his/her confidence in cashless payment 
systems  and  to  raise  his/her  awareness  of  security  levels.  Although  consumers  show  a 
reasonable level of trust, the study shows that an important barrier against the use of cashless 
payments stems from the user's perceived lack of security (based on extraordinary negative 
experiences reported in the news)
109. The study suggests introducing a more general legal 
obligation to communicate security-related information to consumers using certain electronic 
payment instruments as a means to reinforce user trust. This is to some extent achieved by the 
new Directive on Payment Services which, in its Articles 42(2) and 42(5) imposes certain 
information requirements on the use of the payment instrument and its personalised features. 
In the same vein, the ECB indicates that "Issuers, acquirers, cardholders and card acceptors 
should have access to relevant information in order to evaluate financial risks affecting them"
 
                                                 
107  See work package 2 of the study. 
108  Europol,  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  (2007),  p.18:  "[Organised  Crime]  involvement  in 
technology-facilitated crime or the use of technology as a facilitating factor, is largely dependent on the 
development of electronic forms of business, society and banking. As societies become more and more 
dependent  on  technology,  OC  will  find  new  lucrative  crime  opportunities  and  exploit  human 
weaknesses by attacking systems with insufficient security features. The question of security features vs. 
userfriendliness is clearly market-driven and is often solved by emphasising the latter to the detriment 
of the former. Nonetheless, the service- or device-user and the actual user behaviour still have to be 
considered the weakest link in the chain." 
109  The  study  identifies  other  barriers  such  as  the  high  cost  of  some  technologies.  Interestingly,  legal 
restrictions and obligations or contractual restrictions are not considered as important barriers against 
the development of cashless payments. The study provides seven main recommendations, addressed to 
all stakeholders, to overcome the barriers identified in the study. Concerning the recommendations of 
the study, it should be noted that the recently adopted Directive on payment services as well as the anti-
money laundering directive (see above section 3.1) already address some of the concerns expressed in 
the study. Additionally, other recommendations are addressed generally to the stakeholders and that 
work is in progress regarding some of them (e.g. harmonisation of security evaluation in the context of 
SEPA, see above section 3.2).   
See also OECD (2008), Measuring security and trust in the online environment: a view using official 
data, Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society, DSTI/ICCP/IIS(2007)4/final. According 
to the OECD survey, fears expressed by people who do not buy online are not fully justified by the 
problems experience by people who do buy on line. Lack of security of payments was a problem for 
less than 2% of online buyers. See in particular pages 26-34  
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110.Interestingly,  from  the  trust  perspective,  the  study  suggests  that  there  is  no  need  to 
reinforce the liability of the user.  
At the same time, the user capacity should not be overestimated. In general, the consumer is 
the weakest link in security, in particular in the on-line environment, due to lack of knowledge 
and protection: consumers' PCs are not high-security devices. As well as assistance to victims, 
consumers need effective prevention and control systems. It is in their interest to make use of 
recommended security advice and of protection systems offered. Consumer associations in 
FPEG
111 meetings outlined the need to find ways to communicate on security issues. For 
them, consumers can only assume responsibility for risks that they can actually influence in 
terms of risk-avoidance and risk-minimization. There are indeed weaknesses in the systems 
that the consumer cannot really address. Solutions must be safe and but also convenient and 
understandable to be a  success. Additionally, raising security levels in systems should be 
carefully made so as to avoid making the user become the victim
112.  In  this context, the 
concept of trust is crucial and, according to consumers' views, it should rely on openness 
towards the consumer.  
The importance of public awareness and education to enhance trust has been emphasised (in 
relation to identity theft and payment fraud), both by the FPEG and in the conclusions of the 
2006  Conference  (see  above  section  6.2).  In  this  context,  the  Commission  presented  in 
December 2007 a Communication on consumer financial education. This communication sets 
out  some  suggestions  to  assist  financial  education  providers  in  delivering  high  quality 
schemes and describes some planned initiatives to give practical assistance to those delivering 
financial education in the EU Member States. The communication indicates that, among other 
possible benefits to individuals, financial education can help people to avoid the pitfalls of 
payment  fraud
113.  This  communication  followed  a  Commission  Green  Paper  on  retail 
financial services
114, where the importance of consumer confidence and the need to empower 
consumers were largely underlined.  
                                                 
110  ECB, Oversight framework for card payment schemes – standards (January 2008), p.10. See also the 
explanatory memorandum of the ECB standard, op.cit., p.10: "[…] In a CPS this is especially true, 
since the operational risk, including fraud, could lead to financial losses for one or more of the parties 
involved. For example, lack of consistent and up-to date information on how to mitigate fraud – e.g. 
information  on  recognising  skimming  devices  and  protecting  PINs  –  may  cause  financial  loss  and 
decrease confidence in the payment instrument. However the disclosure of sensitive information could 
endanger the security of the CPS.   
Relevant documentation for evaluating possible risks stemming from participation in the CPS should 
also be available to potential actors.   
If issuers, acquirers, cardholders and card acceptors do not have access to information about the risks 
they face as a consequence of participating in a scheme, they may face potential risks stemming from 
clearing and settlement, and from fraud and/or chargeback obligations. […]" 
111  See in particular the minutes of the June 2007 meeting in relation to identity theft and the minutes of the 
December 2007 meeting in relation to the presentation of the study on user identification methods. 
112  See the first paragraph of section 6.2.1 on the risk of increased identity theft attacks as a way to breach 
security. 
113  See,  Communication  from  the  European  Commission  of  18.12.2007,  Financial  education, 
COM(2007)808, in particular page 4. See also the opinion of FIN-USE (Expert Forum of Financial 
Services Users), Financial Education: Changing to second gear – envisioning the way ahead, (January 
2008), in particular page 3. 
114  See  European  Commission,  Green  Paper  of  on  Retail  Financial  Services  in  the  Single  Market, 
30.4.2007, COM(2007)226.   
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6.3.2.  Trust in information society in general 
The European Commission organised on 7 December 2007 a high-level seminar on end-users' 
trust  in  the  information  society
115.  Discussion  focused  on  technology,  dependence  and 
perception, and trying to find the right approach to the security of information networks, 
including the question of identity management. One of the conclusions of the seminar was 
that the awareness and education of the user may be more important than technology. The 
technology exists (including privacy enhancing technologies), but the problems are in most 
cases due to human factors. While security should ideally not be an option, in practice it is, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  oblige  people  to  use  more  security.  The  Commission  is  preparing  a 
Communication on information infrastructure protection
116.  
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
The work conducted in 2004-2007 shows that while it is important to ensure the security of 
means of payment and payment systems, it is also important to improve consumer confidence 
and  trust.  The  new  legal  framework  for  payments,  including  the  "know  your  customer" 
obligations, as well as the development of SEPA by industry should provide a good basis for 
increasing both security and trust. Additionally, the measures adopted by the Commission, 
beyond the Action Plan, in relation to the prevention of and fight against identity theft/fraud 
and cyber crime, should also contribute to those goals. 
In this context, increased consumer education and awareness as well as cooperation of all 
stakeholders  involved  appear  key  to  a  successful  approach  to  the  fraud  problem.  The 
Commission has been giving financial support to actions undertaken by stakeholders related 
to the prevention of/fight against fraud, notably in the context of the research framework 
programme(s) and of the Prevention of and fight against Crime programme. This support is 
likely to continue in the coming years (at least in the 2007-2013 period): information and 
Communication  Technologies  as  well  as  Security  are  mentioned  as  objectives  in  the  EU 
Seventh Research Framework Programme which will be operational during the period 2007-
2013; the Prevention of and fight against Crime programme is also in place in that period.
                                                 
115  www.ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/strategy/activities/awareness_seminar/index_en.htm  
116  Communication from the Commission of 23.10.2007, Commission Legislative and Work Programme 
2008, COM(2007)640, in particular page 26.  
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WEBSITE REFERENCES 
Except where otherwise stated, documents cited in this report, are available at the following 
websites: 
•  Council of Europe 
www.coe.int  
•  ECBS (European Committee for Banking Standards)  
www.ecbs.org  
•  European Central Bank – Payments 
www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/html/index.en.html  
•  European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services – Prevention of payment fraud: 
www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/fraud/index_en.htm  
•  European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services – Payment services: 
www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/index_en.htm  
•  European Commission, DG Justice, Freedom and Security – Financing Programme 
www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/intro/funding_intro_en.htm 
•  European Commission, DG Information society – Network and Information Security 
www.ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/index_en.htm 
•  European Commission – Fraud Prevention Experts Group: 
www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/index_en.htm  
•  European legislation – Eur-lex: 
www.eur-lex.europa.eu  
•  European Payments Council 
www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu  
•  Europol 
www.europol.europa.eu  
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ANNEX 1 - FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE PREVENTION OF AND FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD 
(i) The AGIS programme until 2006 
AGIS was a framework financing programme run by the Commission to help the police, the 
judiciary, professionals and representatives of victim assistance services from the EU Member 
States and candidate countries to co-operate in the fight  against crime, by supporting the 
setting-up  of  Europe-wide  networks,  as  well  as  the  exchange  of  information  and  best 
practices. It also aimed at encouraging Member States to step up co-operation with applicant 
and third countries. AGIS ran from 2003 to 2006 and financed several projects in this field, 
following annual calls for proposals.  
Some of the projects financed by AGIS were directly related to the prevention of and/or the 
fight against payment fraud: 
•  a training programme on 'certified payment card experts' for police officers, presented by 
police departments of 4 Member States. This project received in 2004 a grant of 66.329,77 
EUR (59% of the project estimated cost); 
•  a cooperation network (Interbank Security Observatory) in relation to security of electronic 
payment  services,  presented  by  payment  schemes  of  3  Member  States.  This  project 
received in 2004 a grant of 146.000,00 EUR (69% of the project estimated cost); 
•  a feasibility study for a pan-European card fraud information database, presented by  a 
group  of  several  European  card  schemes.  This  project  received  in  2006  a  grant  of 
121.228,26 EUR (67,51% of the project estimated cost); 
•  a comparative study of the incidence and impact of the recruitment and/or infiltration by 
organised crime groups of persons employed within the retail banking sector, with the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of serious fraud, presented by a British university. 
This  project  received  in  2006  a  grant  of  €  317.660,00  EUR  (69,91%  of  the  project 
estimated cost); 
Several other projects had an indirect relation to this subject, dealing with issues such as: 
protection of crime victims, cyber crime, high tech crime, theft and illegal use of electronic 
devices, joint investigation teams, judicial cooperation, cooperation on asset recovery etc. 
(ii) The new programme on Prevention of and Fight against Crime, 2007 onwards 
A new General financing programme for the period 2007-2013 on "Security and Safeguarding 
Liberties" was set up by  the Council with a total envelope of 745 M€. This programme, 
managed by the Commission, represents a huge increase of EU financial intervention in the 
security area. It is divided into two specific programmes
117: one on Prevention of and Fight 
against Crime (600 M€) and a programme on Prevention of Terrorism (140 M€). A separate 
programme deals with Criminal Justice (200 M€). 
                                                 
117  See OJ L 58, 24.2.2007. .  
EN  31    EN 
The  Programme  on  Prevention  of  and  Fight  against  Crime
118  co-finances  projects  with  a 
European  dimension:  either  trans-national  projects  or  national  projects  respecting  certain 
conditions. It will also provide operating grants for NGOs. Its Annual Work Programmes 
2007 and 2008 identified the prevention of financial crime as a priority objective.  
The 2007 Call for Framework Partnership Agreements (which imply the need to work on a 
regular and stable basis with a network) was published in February 2007. The annual working 
programme for 2007 and the associated calls for proposals were published in May 2007. As a 
reserve list was created, action grants under the 2007 exercise are still being awarded by the 
Commission in 2008.  
While full information on the selected projects is not yet publicly available, in 2007, a project 
presented  by  a  grouping of  consumer  associations  in  relation  to  the  protection  of  critical 
financial  infrastructure  was  selected  for  funding.  This  project  includes  awareness  raising 
activities  and  the  creation  of  a  website  to  collect  information  about  cyber  fraud  in 
transnational payments. It strives at improving the cooperation between the public and private 
sector. It would result into the creation of a European technical catalogue of the fraud at the 
disposal of the judicial and police authorities on the basis of a net of alerts and information 
facilitated by entities and citizens. 
The 2008 Annual Work Programme was published in December 2007. The 2008 Call for 
proposals for Framework Partnership Agreements and the Call for proposals for Operating 
Grants were published respectively in February and March 2008.  
(iii) The Framework Research Programme 
The Commission, both under the 6
th and the 7th Framework Research Programmes
119, has 
been funding research actions in the area of information and communication technologies
120 
with are directly or indirectly related to the prevention of and/or the fight against payment 
fraud. This was notably the case of the research in relation to identity management, with 
projects such as PRIME
121 or FIDIS
122.  
Under the 7
th Framework Research Programme launched in 2006, a research dimension on 
security has been added. The goal of the European Security Research is to make Europe more 
secure  for  its  citizens  while  increasing  its  industrial  competitiveness  by:  developing  the 
technologies and knowledge for building capabilities needed to ensure the security of citizens 
from threats such as, inter alia, acts of (organised) crime, while respecting fundamental rights 
including privacy; ensuring optimal and concerted use of available and evolving technologies 
to the benefit of civil European security; stimulating the co-operation of providers and users 
for civil security solutions; improving the competitiveness of the European security industry 
and delivering mission-oriented results to reduce security gaps. 
                                                 
118  Council Decision 2007/125/JHA of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013, as part 
of General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme ‘Prevention of 
and  Fight  against  Crime’,  OJ  L  58,  24.2.2007,  p.  7.  See  also 
www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/isec/funding_isec_en.htm  
119  For the 7
th Research Framework Programme (2007-2013), see: www.ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/. 
For the 6
th Research Framework Programme (2002-2006), see: www.ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/index_en.cfm + 
dates 
120  www.ec.europa.eu/information_society/research/index_en.htm 
121  www.prime-project.eu. 
122  www.fidis.net   
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There is a convergence in the research actions under the Security theme and the Information 
and Communication Technologies theme, leading in particular to the launching in September 
2007 of a joint call for proposals in relation to critical infrastructure protection (including 
banking and financial infrastructure). The aim is to protect critical infrastructures that can be 
damaged, destroyed or disrupted by deliberate acts of terrorism, natural disasters, negligence, 
mismanagement, accidents, computer hacking, criminal activity and malicious behaviour and 
to safeguard them against incidents, malfunctions and failures.  
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ANNEX 2 - ACTION POINTS OF THE EU ACTION PLAN 2004-2007 
  Action Points identified in the Action Plan  Implementation so far 
1  The  membership  of  the  FPEG  will  be  streamlined  by 
identifying fraud prevention experts in each sector and/or 
country who will be responsible for acting as effective 
contact points within their countries and as multipliers of 
the work carried out in the Group. 
The FPEG secretariat identified experts 
from  the  underrepresented  sectors, 
notably consumers, who were invited to 
the meetings.  
2  A steering group will be established within the FPEG in 
order to carry out more effectively the envisaged actions. 
The steering group will prepare the work of the FPEG 
and supervise the sub-groups' activities. 
The steering group was created.  
3  At least two meetings of the FPEG will take place each 
year. 
One meeting was convened in 2005, two 
in 2006 and two in 2007 
4  The FPEG will be responsible for the preparation of a 
communication  plan  addressed  to  EU  citizens  and 
professionals  on  the  progress  and  effectiveness  of  the 
measures of the new Action Plan. 
The  FPEG  and  the  Commission 
implemented several initiatives aimed at 
increasing awareness in relation to fraud 
prevention.  
5  Two  FPEG  sub-groups  on  security  issues  and  on  user 
issues  will  be  established.  The  subgroups  will  meet 
according  to  the  timetable  and  topics  indicated  by  the 
FPEG. New subgroups may be established by the FPEG. 
Several  subgroups  were  created:  ATM 
security,  communication,  commerce, 
data  management,  identity  theft,  law 
enforcement  issues  and  security 
evaluation,  
6  Within the EU Fraud Prevention Expert Group, a Sub-
Group on Security Issues will be established. The Sub-
Group  will  include  different  stakeholders  according  to 
the topics covered. 
A subgroup on security evaluation was 
created. . 
7  The Commission will launch a study covering cardholder 
verification  methods  on  card  payments  and  user 
verification  methods  on  e-payments  and  mobile 
payments. 
The study was completed. 
8  The Commission will, in co-operation with national data 
protection authorities in the Article 29 Working Party, 
clarify  the  limits  and  conditions  for  exchange  of 
information related to fraud prevention. Alternatively, if 
adequate  clarification  cannot  be  achieved,  the 
Commission will propose legislation to amend existing 
EU data protection rules. 
A  group  on  data  management  was 
created. Its secretariat prepared a report 
on the barriers to data processing, with 
the  cooperation  of  the  data  protection 
authorities.  The  Payment  Services 
Directive integrated a specific article in 
connection to the processing of personal 
data for fraud prevention purposes. 
9  The  Commission  will  expand  the  existing  EU  Fraud 
Prevention Webpage with information on initiatives by 
other organisations active in fraud prevention. 
Specific webpages on the FPEG activity 
were created. 
10  The Commission will organise, in cooperation with the 
payment industry, Europol and other stakeholders, pan-
European  training  sessions  for  specialised  law 
enforcement officers to grant them the status of certified 
experts, as well as update training sessions for already 
certified officers. 
Some  training  initiatives  have  been 
organised  by  Europol  and  the 
international card schemes, and funded 
by the Commission.  
11  The  Commission  will  organise  a  second  high-level 
conference  for  senior  police  officers,  magistrates  and 
prosecutors, to raise awareness on payment fraud and its 
impact on the financial systems. Consideration will be 
A  High  Level  Conference  on  identity 
theft  and  payment  fraud  took  place  in 
November 2006.  
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given to organise such events periodically. 
12  The  Commission  will  assess  the  possible  benefits  of 
establishing  at  national  level  specialised  or  dedicated 
units in fighting payment fraud. 
Due to current trends in payment fraud, 
specialised  units  on  cyber  crime, 
encompassing the fight against payment 
fraud,  tend  to  be  created  at  national 
police level. 
13  The  Commission  will  promote  the  involvement  of 
national competent authorities (created to fight against 
fraud and counterfeit in relation to the Euro bank notes) 
in the prevention of payment fraud. 
Due to current trends in payment fraud, 
the synergies appear to be more closely 
related to the fight against cyber crime 
than to the fight against currency fraud 
and counterfeit. 
14  The  Commission  will  organise  a  seminar  on  fraud 
prevention for representatives of the private sector and 
public authorities of the new Member States. 
A  seminar  for candidate countries  was 
organised in March 2006. 
15  Within the EU Fraud Prevention Expert Group, a Sub-
Group  on  User  Issues  will  be  established.  The  Sub-
Group  will  allow  discussion  at  pan-European  level 
within  the  retail  sector  and  consumer  associations  and 
will  include  different  stakeholders  according  to  the 
topics covered. 
Discussions  on  users'  issues  were 
integrated  into  the  other  subgroups, 
where appropriate.  
16  The  Commission  will  continue  to  discuss  the 
implementation of a single phone number in the EU for 
the notification of lost and stolen cards. 
The Commission has legally reserved in 
February  2007  the  numbers  beginning 
with  116  for  services  of  social  value. 
European  card  schemes  may  apply  for 
the  use  of  the  same  number  across 
Europe  for  the  notification  of  lost  and 
stolen payment cards. 
17  The  payment  card  schemes  should  prepare  common 
educational  tools  for  merchants  covering  all  types  of 
cards. 
No Commission action involved. 
18  The Commission will assess the merits of establishing an 
EU single contact point for citizens and businesses on 
identity theft, which could include a register of bodies 
engaged in the prevention of identity theft. 
The FPEG report on identity theft and 
the High level conference examined this 
issue.  
19  The Commission will promote the creation of a database 
of original and counterfeit identity documents accessible 
to both public authorities and the private sector. 
The  PRADO  database,  disseminating 
information  on  security  features  of 
authentic identity and travel documents 
to the public, entered into operation in 
2007.  The  PRADO  database  is  hosted 
by the general secretariat of the Council  
20  The  Commission  will  organise,  together  with  the 
payment  industry,  awareness  raising  initiatives  on 
payment  fraud  for  the  authorities  of  the  candidate 
countries for EU accession and other European countries. 
A  seminar  for candidate countries  was 
organised in March 2006. 
21  The Commission will continue to cooperate with other 
countries, bilaterally and in multilateral fora such as the 
G8, in order to help combat and prevent fraud. 
Fraud prevention was integrated in the 
bilateral  and  multilateral  discussions 
with  third  countries  in  relation  to  the 
prevention of and fight against financial 
and economic crime.  
 